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COMMENTS
THE EFFECT OF A MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE ON A LEASE
EXECUTED SUBSEQUENT TO THE MORTGAGE
A owns Blackacre in fee. B loans money to A and takes a mortgage
on Blackacre as security for the debt. Subsequent to the execution of
the mortgage A leases the land to C. A then defaults on his debt and B
takes steps to realize on his security. What are the rights and obligations
of B, the mortgagee, C, the lessee and A, the mortgagor-lessor?
The last business depression brought a great many of these trans-
actions into litigation. Defaults on mortgage debts were common and
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foreclosures numerous. Lessees who had entered into long term leases
at high rentals before the "crash" were anxious to be relieved of their
obligations. Foreclosing mortgagees were just as anxious to maintain
the rental income. This was the typical case, although at times the
situation was reversed-the lessee desiring to retain the lease and the
mortgagee wishing to terminate it.
Lease Prior to the Mortgage
As a background for this discussion a short analysis of the relation-
ship between a lessee holding a lease executed prior to the mortgage
and the mortgagee seems desirable. The lessor's mortgagabl interest
consists of the reversion and a right to the rent. At common law
a mortgage subsequent to the lease would, without any specific mention
in the instrument, cover both of these interests."
In title theory states the mortgagee under such a mortgage is en-
titled to the rent, even before default. A statute or a special agreement
may postpone that right until the mortgagor defaults. In either situa-
tion, the requisite privity is found in the mortgagee's succession to the
mortgagor's estate.
2
In lien theory states the mortgagee has no right to rent before default
unless the mortgage so provides. The mortgagor, as owner entitled
to possession until foreclosure, is entitled to collect rents from his ten-
ants, subject to the right of the mortgagee in connection with fore-
closure to have a receiver of rents appointed to protect him in cases
in which his security is precarious.3 In foreclosure a mortgagee who
took with actual or constructive notice of the prior lease can sell only
the lessor's interest and the tenant's rights under the lease cannot be
extinguished. 4
Lease Subsequent to the Mortgage
Where the lease is executed subsequent to the mortgage the relation-
ship of the parties is not so well defined.
(a) Historical. At common law a mortgage of land conveyed the fee
interest, which included the right to immediate possession. Early cases
from title theory states, that is, those jurisdictions adhering to the com-
mon law concept of mortgage, held, in the absence of a clause permitting
'TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1912) § 146 (e); WALSH, MORTGAGES
(1934) 94.
2Otis v. McMillan, 70 Ala. 46 (1881); Noble v. Brooks, 224 Mass. 288,
112 N. E. 649 (1916); F. Groos & Co. v. Chittim (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), 100
S. W. 1006.
3WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) 94, In State ex rel. Gwinn v. Superior Court,
170 Wash. 463, 16 P. (2d) 831 (1932), it was held that R1Fs. REV. STAT. § 804,
which provides that the mortgagee is not entitled to possession until fore-
closure, prevents the mortgagee from taking advantage of a clause in the
mortgage covering rents and profits because it amounts to a taking of
possession prior to foreclosure in violation of the statute. Cf. Debentures,
Inc. v. Zech, 192 Wash. 339, 73 P. (2d) 1314 (1937), which held that where
the assignment of rents was not provided for in the mortgage or in a
separate instrument executed coincident with the execution of the mort-
gage, but was made three years after the mortgage was executed, it con-
stituted a new and entirely valid contract.
'Recording of the lease, or the tenant's possession, are held to constitute
notice of the lease. Taylor v. Bell, 129 Ala. 464, 29 S. W. 572 (1900)
(Lessee's landlord could not impair rights of lessee by giving a mortgage
subsequent to the execution of the lease.); Tropical Inv. Co. v. Brown, 45
Cal. App. 205, 187 Pac. 133 (1920); Heaton v. Grand Lodge, 55 Ind. App.
100, 103 N. E. 488 (1913).
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the mortgagor to retain possession, that the mortgagee could assert his
possessory right before as well as after default. The execution of a
lease subsequent to the mortgage did not deprive him of this right.
Since the mortgagor had neither "title" nor right to possession he had
no interest which he could lease. 5 Consequently any person who took
possession under a purported lease had no more right to possession
of the land than one who had derived his possession from a stranger
to the title. As against the prior mortgagee the tenant was merely a
trespasser and could be evicted as he might by any holder of a para-
mount title.6
Modernly, in both title and lien theory states, the mortgagor is
usually allowed to retain possession of the mortgaged premises until
condition broken,7 or until judicial sale ordered by the decree of fore-
closure,8 and in many instances until the expiration of the statutory
period of redemption.9 The mortgagor's possessory interest is sufficient
to constitute the subject matter of a lease.' 0 As the lessee's right to
possession stems from a similar right in the mortgagor-lessor it is ap-
parent that the mortgagee is not entitled to possession as against the
lessee unless he has that right against the mortgagor. The effect upon
the lessee of the mortgagee's assertion of his possessory rights against
the mortgagor is a matter on which there is a lack of uniformity in
judicial decisions, as is shown by the following analysis of the cases.
(b) Common law rule. One line of authority adheres to the rule that
the mortgagee's assertion of possessory rights and "absolute title" as
against the mortgagor is an eviction of the lessee by title paramount
and that such an eviction terminates the lease and the lessee's liabilities
thereunder." As the tenant's right to possession depends upon that
5Keech ex dem. Warne v. Hall, 1 Doug. 21, 99 Eng. Rep. 17 (1778);
Rogers v. Humphreys, 4 Adol. & El. 299, 111 Eng. Rep. 799 (1835): "If the
lease be subsequent to the mortgage then the mortgagee may treat the
lessee and all those who may be in possession as wrongdoers." Cf. Moss v.
Gallimore, 1 Doug. 279, 99 Eng. Rep. 182 (1779) (mortgagor not really a
tenant at will, but only like such a tenant). Cf. Birch v. Wright, 1 T. R.
378, 99 Eng. Rep. 1148 (1786) (mortgagor's possession is that of the mort-
gagee). Cf. Litchfield v. Ready, 20 L. J. (N. s.) Ex. 51 (1850).8Anderson v. Robbins, 82 Me. 422, 19 Atl. 910 (1890).
Burke v. Willard, 243 Mass. 547, 137 N. E. 744 (1923); Smith v. Shephard,
15 Pick. (Mass.) 147 (1833); Kimball v. Lockwood, 6 R. I. 138 (1859).8McDermott v. Burke, 16 Cal. 580 (1860) (right of mortgagor to posses-
sion ends with transfer of deed, by which sale is consummated); Jones v.
Thomas, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 428 (1847).
ODolese v. Bellows-Claude Neon Co., 261 Mich. 57, 245 N. W. 569 (1932),
(1933) 32 Mcm L. REv. 119; Benz & Sons v. Willar, 198 Minn. 311, 269
N. W. 840 (1936), (1937) 21 MnmN. L. REv. 610.
'IORohrer v. Deatherage, 336 II. 450, 168 N. E. 266 (1929).
"'Fed.: Tyler v. Hamilton. 62 Fed. 187 (C. C. D. Ore. 1894); Moran v.
Pittsburgh C. & St. L. R. Co., 32 Fed. 878 (C. C. D. Ohio 1887), appeal
dismissed 154 U. S. 110 (1893).
Ala.: American Freehold Land Mortgage Co. v. Turner, 95 Ala. 272, 11
So. 211 (1892) (foreclosure by power of sale).
Cal.: Mercantile Trust Co. v. Union Oil Co., 176 Cal. 461, 168 Pac.'1037
(1917); McDermott v. Burke, 16 Cal. 580 (1860); Cf. Title Ins. & Trust Co.
v. Pfenninghausen, 57 Cal. App. 655, 207 Pac. 927 (1922).
Del.: Merchant's Union Trust Co. v. New Philadelphia Graphite Co.,
10 Del. Ch. 18, 83 Atl. 520 (1912).
Ill.: Gartside v. Outley, 58 Ill. 210 (1871); Cf. Reichert v. Bankson, 199
Ill. App. 95 (1916).
Intd.: Jones v. Thomas, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 428 (1847).
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of the mortgagor-lessor, when the latter's right falls the tenant's right
falls with it.
12
In supporting this rule, some cases employ the irrelevant rationale
that if the lease is not terminated the mortgagor thus may defeat entirely
the security of the mortgagee by executing a long-term lease for an
inadequate consideration. 13 This assumes that the only alternative is
preservation of the lease in every instance. It fails to recognize the
possibility of giving the mortgagee an option to preserve or terminate
the lease. The argument also assumes the unlikely possibility that the
mortgagor will be foolish enough to enter into such an unfavorable lease
for the purpose of depriving the mortgagee of his security. The mort-
gagor would be paving the way for a larger deficiency judgment against
himself because of the lower price the land would bring at the fore-
closure sale.
Another argument that has been advanced in behalf of the common
law rule is that the mortgagor cannot make a lease giving a greater
right than he had or which will interfere with the right of the mortgagee
to enter for condition broken.' 4 This involves the same faulty analysis
that is found in the cases dealing with disputes between the lessee and
Iowa.: The Iowa court holds that failure to join the lessee in the fore-
closure action does not deprive the purchaser at foreclosure of his right
to possession, but possession cannot be delivered to him under the process
of that judgment. The purchaser cannot obtain that remedy except by
some other action. Downard v. Groff, 40 Iowa 597 (1875); Dolese v.
Bellows-Claude Neon Co., 261 Mich. 57, 245 N. W. 569 (1932), (1933) 32
MIcH. L. REV. 119 (The fact that lessee was not made a party only affects
the remedy the purchaser must pursue against the lessee to recover pos-
session.); Johns v. Wilson, 6 Ariz. 125, 53 Pac. 583 (1898). The cases are
not clear as to whether the lease is preserved if the lessee is never made
a party to any action.
La.: Thompson v. Flathers, 45 La, Ann. 120, 12 So. 245 (1893); Barelli
v. Szymanski, 14 La. App. 47 (1859).
Me.: Anderson v. Robbins, 82 Me. 422, 19 Ati. 910 (1890) (title theory).
Mass.: Burke v. Willard, 243 Mass. 547, 137 N. E. 744 (1923) (title theory);
Smith v. Shephard, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 147 (1883) (Entry on condition broken
allowed by statute.).
Mich.: Dolese v. Bellows-Claude Neon Co. 261 Mich. 57, 245 N. W. 569
(1932), (1933) 32 McH. L. REV. 119.
Minn.: Benz & Sons v. Willar, 198 Minn. 311, 269 N. W. 840 (1936),
(1937) 21 MirN. L. REV. 610 (lien theory).
Mo.: McFarland Real Estate Co. v. J. Gerardi Hotel Co., 202 Mo. 597,
100 S. W. 577 (1907) (power of sale in instrument).
N. H.: Hale v. Nashua R. Co., 60 N. H. 333 (1880).
R. I.: Kimball v. Lockwood, 6 R. I. 138 (1859) (title theory).
Eng.: Rogers v. Humphreys, 4 Adol. & El. 299, 111 Eng. Rep. 799 (1835);
Keech ex dm. Warne v. Hall, 1 Doug. 21, 99 Eng. Rep. 17 (1778) (title
theory).
12McDermott v. Burke, 16 Cal. 580 (1860). Some of the actions available
to the mortgagee against the lessee after assertion of his paramount title
are indicated in Castleman v. Belt, 2 B. Mon. (Ky) 157 (1841). The mort-
gagee can bring ejectment, or maintain trespass for mesne profits after
the date of the deed, or waive trespass and sue in assumpsit for use and
occupation from the date of the mortgagee's demise. But he cannot
distrain and bring an action for rent on the lease. Rogers v. Humphreys,
4 Adol. & El. 299, 111 Eng. Rep. 799 (1835).
laAmerican Freehold Land Mtg. Co. v. Turner, 95 Ala. 272, 11 So. 211
(1892); Reichert v. Bankson, 199 Ill. App. 95 (1916); Barelli v. Szymanski,
14 La. App. 47 (1859).14Westside Trust & Say. Bank v. Lopoten, 358 Ill. 631, 193 N. E. 462 (1934).
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the purchaser upon foreclosure, next to be discussed.
The argument chiefly relied upon in these cases is that the rights
of the mortgagee and the purchaser at the foreclosure sale are not fixed
by the status at the date of the sale but relate back to the date of the
mortgage. Thus, it is said, that since the lease was not in existence when
the mortgage was made, there were no rights against a tenant which
could be transferred upon the foreclosure sale; the reversion created
later by the execution of the lease is subject to the prior mortgage and
when such reversion is destroyed by foreclosure the leasehold falls with
it.15 The weakness in this argument is that it employs a fiction--relation
back-as a substitute for an analysis of the relations actually existing
between the parties with respect to the mortgaged subject matter. In
the normal case one who mortgages land has a fee simple interest.
Designating the owner's interest as "", when7 the owner mortgages
he divides his interest, "M", into two parts: "M,", the fee simple subject
to be entirely divested if the mortgage conditions are not fulfilled, and
"M2", the interest of the mortgagee, which consists of a power to ac-
quire or create in a purchaser at foreclosure sale a fee simple absolute
in the land if there is a default upon the mortgage. When the mortgagor'
subsequently leases the land he again divides his interest at that time,
"M1 ", in two parts: "Mla", a possessory leasehold, and "Mb", a
reversion expectant upon the leasehold. The mortgagee's interest,
"M2 ", remains the same, except that it now applies to the two parts
into which "M1 " has been divided; his power now exists with respect
to both parts. There is no need to talk about "relation back." Upon
breach of the conditions in the mortgage the power can be exercised
with respect to the interests as they then appear. The only question to
be considered is whether the mortgagee has taken the steps necessary to
exercise his power of foreclosure and sale as to both interests. If he has,
the sale operates upon the interests as they are at the time of the sale,
not upon the interests as they were when the mortgage was made.
Another feature of the decisions in this line of authority is the rule
that the leasehold is terminated without the joining of the mortgagor's
lessee in the foreclosure action. It is usually said that he need not be
joined because he is not beneficially interested in the claim secured or
in the estate mortgaged.1 6 It is submitted that this holding is based
upon a rationale Which is valid today in but a small number of states1 7
because of the change in theory as to the effect of a mortgage upon
the possessory rights of the parties. In a jurisdiction which adheres to
the original common law theory of mortgages, the mortgagee being
entitled to possession of the land from the time of the execution of the
mortgage the proposition that the lessee's rights are extinguished with-
out joining him as a party defendant in the foreclosure action is valid.
As the mortgagor's possession-if he was in possession when the lease
was made-is merely by sufferance of the mortgagee the mortgagor's
lessee is not more than a tenant at sufferance, or more likely he is but
1 Reed v. Bartlett, 9 MIl. App. 267 (1881); Kimball v. Lockwood, 6 R. I.
138 (1859); 1 TiFFANy, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1912) § 73; S. A. Gard,
Lessee's Status after Foreclosure of a Prior Mortgage (1933) 1 KAN. CirY
L. REv. 11; see infra, p. 44.
26McDermott v. Burke, 16 Cal. 580 (1860).
27See 2 JoNEs, MORTGAGEES (8th ed.,1928) 225, n. 62.
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a trespasser, as to the mortgagee.18 As such he is subject to summary
eviction by the mortgagee, even before default upon the mortgage;
a priori, after default either with or without foreclosure proceedings
against him. It follows, then, that there is no need to join the mort-
gagor's lessee under the original common law theory. But if the mort-
gagor is entitled to possession, the situation is entirely different, and
modernly the mortgagee is entitled to such possession at least until
default. The mortgagor then has an interest which he can transfer
to another or out of which he can carve lesser interests in favor of
another. The lessee acquires from his lessor possessory rights which,
although subject to defeasance, must, nevertheless, be foreclosed if
they are to be defeated. The reason underlying the result under the
strict common law theory thus fails in most of the American states.
The cases, therefore, which simply follow the earlier authorities without
taking into consideration what the rule of the jurisdiction is as to pos-
session before default or foreclosure are not well reasoned, and it may
be suggested that the rule permitting the leasehold to be extinguished
without the joindure of the tenant deprives the tenant of his property
without due process in a state which follows the more modern theory
of mortgages.
In the states generally adhering to this view the termination of the
lessee's interest is avoided, however, if "authority" is contained in the
mortgage,19 or if the lease is executed by both the mortgagor and the
mortgagee,20 or where by prior conduct the purchaser at the foreclosure
sale is estopped to claim that the leasehold is extinguished. 21 Moreover,
while the rule normally forbids the adoption by the mortgagee or the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale of the benefits of the lease without the
consent of the lessee2 2 it is recognized that the mortgagee or the pur-
chaser, by conduct indicating an intent to recognize the lessee as his
tenant and by the tenant's recognition of the mortgagee or the purchaser
as his landlord, may create a new lease. 23 If no new lease is made the
tenant by mere acknowledgment of the mortgagee or purchaser as his
landlord, that is by attorning to him, 24 may become a tenant at will,
8Even if the mortgagor were in possession as tenant at will of the
mortgagee, the possessory rights of both the mortgagor and his lessee
would be terminable merely by notice. See Public Service Co. v. Vou-
domas, 84 N. H. 387, 151 Atl. 81 (1930). Moreover, the transfer of the
mortgagor's interest upon foreclosure sale would terminate the possessory
rights of both. See 1 TIFFANY, RE.AL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) 261.
'Merchant's Union Trust Co. v. New Philadelphia Granite Co., 10 Del.
Ch. 18, 83 Atl. 520 (1912). What constitutes such an authority is not made
clear by the decision. It might mean that if the mortgage contained apledge or assignment of rents it would be regarded as a contract to assign
the reversion when it comes into existence, when it would operate some-
what like a mortgage on after-acquired property.
20Flynn v. Lowrance, 110 Okla. 150, 236 Pac. 594 (1924).
2'McDermott v. Burke, 16 Cal. 580 (1860); Mercantile Trust Co. v.
Union Oil Co., 176 Cal. 461, 168 Pac. 1037 (1917).
"2Moran v. Pittsburgh C. & St. L. R. Co., 32 Fed. 878 (C. C. S. D. Ohio
1887), appeal dismissed, 154 U. S. 110 (1893).
23McDermott v. Burke, 16 Cal. 580 (1860); Reichert v. Bankson, 199 Ill.
App. 95 (1916); Gartside v. Outley, 58 Ill. 210 (1871). See 1 TIFANY,
LANDLORD AND TENANT (1912) §§ 73 (3), 73 (6).
:It has been urged that the mortgagee or purchaser is precluded from
asserting his rights against the tenant or from obtaining an acknowledg-
ment of tenancy from him by reason of an English statute-l GEo. I,
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and this may be converted into a periodic tenancy by payment and
acceptance of rent. 5
(c) New York Rule. Recent cases indicate a growing trend toward
what is referred to as the New York rule. These jurisdictions give the
mortgagee the option of preserving or terminating the lease. By making
the tenant a party defendant to the foreclosure proceedings the mortga-
gee may terminate the lease. By omitting him from the proceedings,
the mortgagee may preserve the lease.2 6 If the lease is preserved the
lessee pays the rent reserved in the original lease."
The cases supporting this rule are not in harmony in their reasons for
so doing. The leading case of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Childs28
relied on a statute29 which provides that:
"The grantee of leased real property, or a reversion thereof,
c. 19, § 11-, adopted in many states-see, e. g., IOWA CODE (1935) § 2013-,
which makes void all attornments to "strangers," excepting an attornment
to a mortgagee "after the mortgage has been forfeited." Reichert v. Bank-
son, 199 Ill. App. 95 (1916), where the court said of the mbrtgagee, "he is
an absolute stranger to such tenant." But these statutes cannot prevent
the mortgagee who is entitled to possession from asserting his possessory
rights by an eviction of the tenant and they do not seem intended to
preclude an attornment by a tenant to one, who by reason of paramount
title, has a'right to evict him and is threatening to do so. Westside Trust
and Say. Bank v. Lopoten, 358 I3. 631, 193 N. E. 462 (1934). As eviction
by paramount title is always a defense to a claim for rent, acquisition of
possession by the mortgagee relieves the tenant from the duty to pay rent
to the mortgagor-lessor. Smith v. Shephard, 15 Pick (Mass.) 147 (1833).
The same is true when, to avoid an actual eviction, the tenant attorns to the
mortgagee or purchaser, since an attornment is properly regarded as
"constructive" eviction by paramount title. Kimball v. Lockwood, 6 R. I.
138 (1859). See 1 TiF'Awy, LANDLORD AD TENANT (1912) §§ 73 (4), 182 (2) a.
2 Gartside v. Outlay, 58 Ill. 210 (1871); Kimball v. Lockwood, 6 R. I.
138 (1859). Dicta in some cases have also indicated that if the tenant is
permitted to make extensive improvements under the terms of the lease,
the mortgagee or purchaser will be held to have consented to an extension
of the lease. McDermott v. Burke, 16 Cal. 580 (1860); Gartside v. Outlay,
supra; but cf. Anderson v. Robbins, 82 Me. 422, 19 Atl. 910 (1890).26Fla.: Dundee Naval Stores Co. v. McDowell, 65 Fla. 15, 61 So. 108
(1913).
Ga.: Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown & Randolph Co., 154 Ga. 229,
114 S. E. 36 (1922).
nZ.: Gale v. Carter, 154 Ill. App. 478 (1910); Richardson v. Hadsall, 106
Ill. 476 (1883); Cf. Westside Trust & Say. Bank v. Lopoten, 358 Ill. 631, 193
N. E. 462 (1934) (joinder not mentioned); Cf. Rohrer v. Deatherage, 336
l. 450, 168 N. E. 266 (1929).
Mont.: Blodgett Loan Co. v. Hansen, 86 Mont. 406, 284 Pac. 140 (1930)
semble; Dolin v. Wachter, 87 Mont. 466, 288 Pac. 616 (1930) semble.
Neb.: Munday v. O'Neil, 44 Neb. 724, 63 N. W. 32 (1895).
N. J.: Walgreen Co. v. Moore, 116 N. J. Eq. 348, 173 Atl. 587 (1934);
Ellveeay Newspaper Workers' B. & L. Ass'n v. Wagner Market Co., 110
N. J. L. 577, 166 Ati. 332 (1933); Union Inv. Co. of N. J. v. McDonough,
94 N. J. L. 130, 109 At. 301 (1920).
N. Y.: Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Childs, 230 N. Y. 285, 130 N. E. 295
(1921); Commonwealth Mortgage Co. v. DeWaltoff, 135 App. Div. 33, 119
N. Y. Supp. 781 (1909); Hirsch v. Livingstone, 3 Hun. (N. Y.) 9 (1874).
"Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown & Randolph Co., 154 Ga. 229, 114
S. E. 36 (1922); Commonwealth Mortgage Co. v. DeWaltoff, 135 App. Div. 33,
119 N. Y. Supp. 781 (1908).
2 230 N. Y. 285. 130 N. E. 295 (1921).20McKnqNY's CONS. LAWS or N. Y. (1917) § 223.
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or of any rent, the devisee or assignee of the lessor of such
lease.., has the same remedies ... for the non-performance
of any agreement contained in the assigned lease . . .as his
grantor or lessor had, or would have had, if the reversion had
remained in him."
The court felt that the purchaser at the foreclosure sale was a "grantee
of the reversion" within the meaning of the statute,30 saying: "It is
precisely the same so far the estate granted was concerned as if the
lease had been prior to the mortgage. 
1
The Childs case has been criticized by one writer 32 on the basis that
the statute cited by the New York court is inapplicable to the situation
under consideration. Granting that this is true3 3 the writer's conclu-
sion that the leasehold interest is necessarily terminated upon fore-
closure of the mortgage without the tenant being joined as a party
defendant is based upon wholly erroneous conceptions as to the nature
of the relationships created by a mortgage and subsequent lease in any
case in which the mortgagor is entitled to possession, either by statute
or agreement, until default upon the conditions of the mortgage.3 4
"Accord: Blodgett Loan Co. v. Hansen, 86 Mont. 406, 284 Pac. 140
(1930); Ellveeay Newspaper Workers' B. & L. Ass'n v. Wagner Market
Co., 110 N. J. L. 577, 166 Atl. 332 (1933); Commonwealth Mortgage Co. v.
DeWaltoff, 135 App. Div. 33, 119 N. Y. Supp. 781 (1909).
"3The court then adds the meaningless sentence, "Therefore it is neces-
sary to join the lessee before his interest is cut off." If the language of
the court is to be literally construed in that this transaction is to be given
the same status as a lease made prior to the mortgage, the mortgage would
be subject to the lease and joinder of the lessee will not terminate the
lease. See cases cited note 2, supra. The assignee of the reversion has no
right to terminate the lease except for the lessee's failure to perform the
conditions of the lease.
32S. A. Gard, Lessee's Status After Foreclosure of a Prior Mortgage
(1933) 1 KAN. C=r L. REv. 11.
"The English prototype of this statute was 32 HENRY v, c. 34 (1540).
This statute was an aftermath of the dissolution of the monastaries and
was designed to permit the lords, to whom Henry VIII had given the
confiscated lands, to take advantage of covenants and conditions in leases
of the forfeited lands, a transferee of a reversion being unable, by reason
of the normal common law rule against alienation of rights of re-entry,
to insist upon such rights. See Co. LrrT. 215a; 7 HOLDSWORTH, HisToRY OF
ENGLISH LAW (1926) 288; 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) 355.
There never was any doubt as to the transferability of the reversion
expectant upon a leasehold or as to the transferee's right to rent. See
HOLDSWORTH, ZOC. cit. supra, at 264-265. As the latter question only is
involved here, the common law rule covers the case and resort to the
statute is unnecessary.
"See pages 41-42, supra, for discussion of the nature of the interests
resulting from a mortgage and subsequent lease, and as to the necessity
for joining the tenant as a party defendant in the foreclosure proceeding.
The writer of the article mentioned fails, as have some courts, to realize
the significance of the change in theory as to possessory rights of the
mortgagor upon the relationships created by mortgage and lease. The
writer also falls into the additional error of stating that the leasehold
interest falls because there is no privity of contract between the mortgagee
or purchaser at foreclosure sale and the mortgagor's lessee. This has no
support whatever in common law theory. From earliest times it has
been recognized that only privity of estate is necessary to continue the
relationship. There is privity of estate between the assignee of the rever-
sion and the original lessee by reason of the succession of the mortgagee
or purchaser at foreclosure sale to the mortgagor-lessor's interest. See 1
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) 174; also see WALsH, LAW OF REAL
[VOL. 17
COMMENTS
Although the reasoning set forth in the Childs case may leave something
to be desired, the result is the only proper one in a jurisdiction which
gives the mortgagor the right to possession until foreclosure upon
default or some time thereafter.
In other cases reaching the same result as the Childs case the courts
have been equally inept in stating reasons for the conclusion reached.
In supporting the rule that the lessee must be joined in the foreclosure
proceedings before his interest can be terminated, one court advanced
the unconvincing argument that failure to cut off the outstanding lease
will cause the property to be sold at a price below what it would bring
if that interest is not attached.3 5 This is not a reason why the lessee
must be joined, but is an assumption that he must be joined before his
interest is extinguished. The court also relied on the apparent fallacy
that the lease in every instance is disadvantageous to the owners of
the reversion. In the majority of cases- the land with the lease attached
is worth more than it would be if it had no rental income.3 6
One court advanced the reason that if the lessee had prepaid the
rent for the full term, he should be made a party so he could protect
himself by being allowed to claim a recoupment from the surplus aris-
ing from the sale which had been turned over to the mortgagor.3 This
PRoPERTY (2d ed. 1927) 462, n. 7, for citation of early English commen-
tators.35Gale v. Carter, 154 Ill. App. 478 (1910) (mortgagor objecting to non-joinder of lessee).6New Jersey has developed a unique rule stemming from the applica-
tion of a statute (N. J. RPv. STAT. [19371 2:65-1 et seq.) which provides
that complete exhaustion of the property and all interests therein is a
condition precedent to an action on the bond for a deficiency arising out
of a sale of the mortgaged premises. It was first held that failure to make
a tenant of the mortgaged premises a party defendant to the foreclosure
and thus to bar his interest was a failure completely to exhaust the prop-
erty and "all interests therein." Ellveeay Newspaper Workers' B. & L.
Ass'n v. Wagner Market Co., 110 N. J. L. 577, 166 Atl. 332 (1933). The
theory is that a failure to make a tenant a party may prevent the property
from bringing the best possible price at the sale. In American & Italian
B. & L. Co. v. Liotta, 117 N. J. L. 467, 189 Ati. 118 (1936), it was said
that the mortgagee is under a duty to join all persons having an interest
in the property, on the theory that both advantageous and disadvantageous
leases may deter a certain class of bidders. "There may be those who are
interested in the property for some particular or special purpose requiring
immediate possession." Subsequent cases realized that the strict applica-
tion of this rule in cases where the lease is advantageous would result in
a sale of the land at a lower value than if the lease were preserved, thereby
defeating the purpose of the statute. The cases now hold that if the
mortgagee can prove that failure to join the lessee has not lessened the
vendible value of the mortgaged premises he has exhausted his security
in compliance with the statute. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hoffman, 116 N. J.
Misc. 340, 199 Atl. 781 (1938); Harvester B. & L. v. Elbaum, 119 N. J. L.
437, 196 Atl. 709 (1937); see also Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Chausmer,
120 N. J. L. 208, 198 AUt. 828 (1938); Strafford B. & L. Ass'n v. Wagner,
122 N. J. Eq. 452, 194 AtL 440 (1937). The application of the statute to
these cases has put the mortgagee between Scylla and Charybdis. He is
compelled either to cut off all advantageous leaseholds, thereby decreasing
the value of his security, or to subject himself to further litigation,
wherein the jury must determine as an issue of fact that the failure to
join the tenant did or did not deter public bidding. Note (1939) 4 U.
NEwAmc L. REv. 206 passim.37Dundee Naval Stores Co. v. McDowell, 65 Fla. 15, 61 So. 108 (1913)(In the absence of statute, rent is not normally apportionable as to time.);
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argument does not indicate a necessity for joinder. Although it might
be desirable to prevent a multiplicity of actions in any jurisdiction
that might regard rent apportionable as to time, the lessee could clearly
maintain a separate action at law to recover his prepaid rent from the
mortgagor-lessor.
A better reason for the requirement of joinder recognizes the prin-
ciple that the purchaser at the foreclosure sale takes the mortgagor's
title as it existed when the mortgage was made, but subject to all junior
interests if the owners of such interests are not joined as defendants in
the foreclosure action.3 8 As the holders of these interests have the
right to redeem from the mortgage, it follows that they must be joined
to cut off this right on the foreclosure of a prior mortgage.3 9 Due
process would seem to require a "day in court" before this right could
be extinguished. 40 Failure to join them would make it impossible to
transfer a clear title to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale.
Another group of cases, recognizing that the subsequent lessee should
have the same rights as other junior interests in foreclosure, requires
the joinder of the lessee so that he may take advantage of the doctrine
of marshalling of assets; that is, that he may require the reversionary
interest to be first subjected to the payment of the mortgage debt.41
Reasoning along the same line, the New Jersey court 2 has required
the joinder of the lessee so that he might request a sale in the inverse
order of alienation. The court said the mortgage covered three separate
interests, the leasehold and two parcels in fee which had been conveyed
by the mortgagor subsequent to the execution of the lease. The decree
impliedly directed that the leasehold should be sold only in case the
other parcels do not produce a sufficient sum to pay the debt. This
right would exist in every case where the value of the land subject to
the lease would be sufficient to discharge the obligation, and there is
no reason why the lessee, the same as any junior encumbrancer, should
not be able to take advantage of these principles of mortgage foreclosure
when the rest of the circumstances permit.
The New York rule is the most desirable from the standpoint of
policy. There is no reason why the lessee should be allowed to escape
the terms of a lease voluntarily entered into by him because of a change
of ownership in the fee. If the mortgagee preserves the lease, the rights
and obligations of the lessee are the same as they would be following
see Porter v. Tull, 6 Wash. 408, 33 Pac. 965 (1893) (Where building occupied
by tenant destroyed by fire, held, that tenant could recover rent paid in
advance for portion of month remaining after destruction of premises.).
38WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) §§ 74, 76.
"Foster v. Trowbridge, 44 Minn. 290, 46 N. W. 350 (1890) (second mort-
gagee not made a party to foreclosure did not lose right of redemption);
Cram v. Cottrell, 48 Neb. 646, 67 N. W. 452 (1896); WALSH, MORTGAGES
(1934) § 68.
I°Dundee Naval Stores Co. v. McDowell, 65 Fla. 15, 61 So. 108 (1913);
Note (1937) 21 MnN. L. REv. 610.
"
t Dundee Naval Stores Co. v. McDowell, 65 Fla. 15, 61 So. 108 (1913);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown & Randolph Co. 154 Ga. 229, 114 S. E.
36 (1922): "Where the lessee has equities, the mortgagee should be
required to sell the property in the first instance subject to the lease when
such sale will fully pay off and discharge his demand, and when to permit
a sale otherwise would destroy and wipe out the lease."
"Union Inv. Co. of N. J. v. McDonough, 74 N. J. L. 130, 109 Atl. 301
(1920).
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an assignment of the reversion, or a retention of the reversion by the
mortgagor. His position is in no way jeopardized dr made more burden-
some by the mortgagee's election to preserve the lease: The mortgagee's
election to terminate the lease is a contingency which the lessee should
anticipate. He knows when he enters into the lease that he is getting
an interest subordinate to that of the prior mortgagee and which is sub-'
ject to divestment by default on the mortgage debt and exercise of the
mortgagee's option.
The mortgagee would terminate the lease only if it detracts from
the value of the security and the sale of the land cleared of the lease
would bring a better price than a sale subject to the lease. Conversely,
he will preserve the' lease when it enhances the value of the security.
Whatever the election of the mortgagee may be his interests are so tied
in with those of the mortgagor that the benefits resulting from his
choice will inure to the latter.
The lessee is not defenseless. At the time he enters the lease he may
request the mortgagee to agree, as part of the consideration for the
lease, not to evict him in the event of a foreclosure, or he may request
that the mortgagee become a party to the lease,43 or he may even get
a subordination agreement. If the lease is advantageous the mortgagee
should be only too willing to consent to such an arrangement. If he
does not consent the lessee can refuse to execute the lease.
The lessee is further protected by his right to an action against the
mortgagor for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment if he is evicted
by paramount title prior to the expiration of the term.44
When formal joinder is not necessary: In jurisdictions subscribing
to the New York rule formal joinder of the lessee is not always neces-
sary to terminate his leasehold interest. It has been held that a
person who takes a lease subject to the mortgage and fails to record
it before the commencement of the foreclosure action, whose possession
is not sufficient to impute notice to the mortgagee, and whose interest
is not actually known to the mortgagee, will be bound by the decree.
He will be regarded as a party defendant joined in the action.45 A
New Jersey case held that a lessee who had full knowledge of the
foreclosure proceedings and concealed his interest therein could be taken
out of possession by a writ of assistance issued at the instance of the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale.4 6 Such conduct bound him to the
decree as much as if he had been formally joined.47
When the lease is terminated: Although all of the jurisdictions fol-
lowing the New York rule uniformly hold that joinder of the lessee as
"
3Flynn v. Lowrance, 110 Okla. 150, 236 Pac; 594 (1924).
"See infra, p. 48.
'
5Virges v. Gregory, 97 Wash. 333, 166 Pac. 610 (1917) semble; Hager
v. Astorg, 145 Cal. 548, 79 Pac. 68 (1904) ("assuming grantee" bound by
decree).
46Strong v. Smith, 68 N. J. Eq. 686, 60 Atl. 66 (1905).
'
7Welsh v. Schoen, 59 Hun. (N. Y.) 356, 13 N. Y. Supp. 71 (1891)
(Failure of lessee to record lease before filing of foreclosure complaint
did not bar him from defending his possession on the ground that he
was not made a party when he was in possession of the premises when
the action was begun.); Strong v. Smith, 68 N. J. Eq. 686, 60 Atl. 66 (1905)
(If mortgagee, at the commencement of the suit, had notice of lessee's
possession or of existence of lease, he would be bound to inquire as to
lessee's interest in the premises and make him a party to the foreclosure
suit.).
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a party defendant in the foreclosure action is necessary to terminate
his leasehold interest, the further question arises as to the stage in the
proceedings at which the lessee's interest is extinguished. The Wash-
ington court in Virges v. Gregory4 8 held that even though the lessee
is joined in the foreclosure action, his duty to pay rent continues
until the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. gets absolute title at the
end of the period of redemption. If the mortgagor redeems, the lessee's
liability under the lease is not cut off. "If this were not so, and the
tenancy was terminated by the mere sale at the commencement of
the period, and should the mortgagor redeem within that period, he
would find the tenancy terminated years before the expiration of the
lease, though the title, to the property had never passed out of him."49
This same reasoning could be applied to cases adhering to the common
law rule, where a right of redemption exists in the mortgagor.
In the Childs case5° the lessee, who was joined in the foreclosure
action, moved out of the premises after the entry of the judgment but
before the sale. Prior to the sale the judgment against him was vacated.
In an action brought by the purchaser at the foreclosure sale for
rent, the court said that neither the beginning of an action to foreclose
nor an entry of a judgment of foreclosure and sale constitutes an evic-
tion. "The sale may never occur. The amount due may be paid. The
mortgagee may repent. Until the sale actually takes place the tenant
remains liable to his landlord on the contract." A further reason the
court might have added is that the mortgagor might have a substan-
tial defense to the debt and mortgage. 1
By holding that entry of judgment does not amount to an eviction,
the court has placed the lessee in a dilemma. If he remains in pos-
session until the sale it may take him weeks or even months to find
other suitable premises. If he moves out and enters into another lease
he may find himself still bound on the first lease. Although it is true
that the mere existence of a paramount title does not amount to an
actual eviction, courts would remove the lessee's present uncertainty
without materially injuring the mortgagee by holding that the mort-
gage.e has made an irrevocable election by joining the lessee and carry-
ing the foreclosure proceedings to judgment; and that such conduct
constitutes an eviction as a matter of law. This problem does not exist
in jurisdictions, such as Washington, which have statutes allowing the
lessee to remain in possession for the determined period of redemp-
tion.52
Failure to join the lessor-mortgagor: The rule has been stated that
if the mortgagor-lessor is not made a party defendant to the foreclosure,
the lease is not terminated and the lessee cannot refuse to pay rent to
the mortgagor-lessor on the ground of constructive eviction.53 His
4597 Wash. 333, 166 Pac. 610 (1917).
49REIM. REv. STAT. § 602 allows a tenant under an unexpired lease to
retain possession during the period of redemption. Walgreen Co. v. Moore,
116 N. J. Eq. 348, 173 Atl. 587 (1934) (filing of bill to foreclose does not
constitute an eviction); Blodgett Loan Co. v. Hansen, 86 Mont. 406, 284
Pac. 140 (1930) semble; Dolin v. Wachter, 87 Mpnt. 466, 288 Pac. 616 (1930)
semble; Sullivan v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. 133, 195 Pac. 1061 (1921).
50230 N. Y. 285, 130 N. E. 295 (1921).
"
tThompson v. Flathers, 45 La. Ann. 120, 12 So. 245 (1893).52Supra n. 49.
"
3Alford v. Carver, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 607, 72 S. W. 869 (1903).
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lessor's title being unaffected by the decree, the tenant cannot question
it or attorn to another. An interesting suggestion has been made that
if the purchaser has a right of possession against the lessee, by reason
of the latter having been made a party to the foreclosure proceeding,
he has title paramount to that of the lessee and eviction might be
asserted as a defense to a claim for rent irrespective of whether the
mortgagor was a party or not.5 4 The difficulty with this suggestion is
that it fails to recognize that the lessee's right to possession stems from
the mortgagor's right to possession and if the mortgagor still has that
right it is difficult to understand how it can be taken from him by
joining his lessee in the foreclosure action. If the mortgagee is not
entitled to possession against the mortgagor, how can he be against
the mortgagor's lessee?
(d) Pennsylvania rule. The Pennsylvania court has gone even farther
than the New York court in allowing the mortgagee to preserve the
lease. The legislature adopted a statute5 which provides that an execu-
tion purchaser of lands, which at the time of the sale were in posses-
sion of a tenant, is deemed the landlord of such tenant and is given
the same rights against him "as the owner might have had if no such
sale had been made." The court has held that such purchaser under
the act succeeds to the benefit of the contract if he chooses to have it.
If he disaffirms the lease, he severs the relationship and extinguishes
the tenancy and he is no longer entitled to the statutory remedies.5
The mortgagee is not required to join the tenant to extinguish the lease.
What constitutes an affirmance or disaffirmance is not entirely clear,
but it has been held that suing on the contract for rent would be a
confirmation of the lease.5 7
(e) Washington. Whether Washington will follow the New York or
the common law rule when the court is confronted with this type of
case is a question which cannot be answered until the decision is
rendered. In Virges v. Gregory58 a lessee, who had failed to record
his lease prior to the. commencement of the foreclosure action, asserted
as a defense to an action for rent brought by the purchaser at foreclosure
that as he was in effect a party to the action the foreclosure decree
terminated his tenancy and relieved him from the obligation to pay
rent. The court said that in any event the statute allows the lessee
to retain possession until the expiration of the period of redemption 5
and that until that time he is liable to the purchaser for rent. It was
unnecessary to decide whether or not the joinder or non-joinder of
the lessee would have any effect in terminating the lease. It is sug-
gested that the Washington court's respect for decisions of the New
York court, augmented by the fact that the lessee has the right to
redeem 0 from the foreclosure sale, will lead it to adopt the New
r1 TiFFANy, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1912) 420.
rPuRDoN'S PENN. STAT. (1936) 12:2611.
"
6Hemphill v. Tevis, 4 W. & S. (Pa.) 535 (1842).57Hemphill v. Tevis, 4 W. & S. (Pa.) 635 (1842); W. H. Lloyd, The Mort-
gagee and the Tenants of the Mortgagor (1931) 10 PENN. B. A. Q.; see also,
Roush v. Herbick, 269 Pa. 145, 112 Atl. 136 (1920); Westside Trust & Say.
Bank v. Lopoten, 358 Ill. 631, 193 N. E. 462 (1934) (Mortgagee, on condition
broken, may treat tenant as trespasser or he may "elect" to recognize
lessee as his tenant.).
5597 Wash. 333, 166 Pac. 610 (1917).
"RsmEV. REv. STAT. §§ 600, 602. 6°Rmv. R v. STAT. § 594.
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York rule when the occasion arises.
(f) General rules applicable to all jurisdictions. Lessee's right to pay
the mortgage debt. The tenant has the right at common law and inde-
pendent of the provisions of the lease to protect his lease by paying the
mortgage on the leased property and taking an assignment of it.,1
Prepayment of rent: Where the subsequent lessee has paid the rent
in advance the courts hold that it is no defense to the mortgagee's
right to have the property free of the lease.6 2 The lessee is charged
with notice of the prior mortgage and anticipates the payment of rent
thereon at his peril. 63 To hold that prepayment of rent would preserve
the lease until the expiration of the term would enable the mortgagor
to defeat the security of the mortgagee and would open the door for
fraud in every case of rent productive property where the security is
inadequate for the payment of the mortgaged debt."4
Lessee's right to sue for breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment: The
mortgagor-lessor is liable to the tenant for a breach of the covenant
of quiet enjoyment when the tenant is evicted by a prior mortgagee. 65
The tenant is entitled to recover substantial damages measured by the
value of the unexpired term less rents reserved and to look for reim-
bursement to the surplus money which may be realized on a fore-
closure sale."6 This action will not be available to the tenant if the
lease contains express provisions negativing or limiting the covenant
of quiet enjoyment. For example, if the lease provides that it is
"subject to the mortgage" it would exclude any warranty on behalf of
the mortgagor-lessor against eviction by the mortgagee's paramount
title.6 7 The tenant's right to maintain this action may be valueless as
it is very likely that a mortgagor who could not make payments on the
mortgage debt would not have property which could satisfy a judgment.
SNYDER JED KING
OlAverill v. Taylor, 8 N. Y. 44 (1853); C. M. Lewis, Effect of Foreclosure
of Mortgage on a Lease (1932) 25 LAW & BANx. 78.
0
'Rohrer v. Deatherage, 336 Ill. 450, 168 N. E. 266 (1929).6 3State ex rel. Coker v. Dist. Ct., 159 Okla. 10, 11 P. (2d) 495 (1932).
"Fletcher v. McKeon, 71 App. Div. 278, 75 N. Y. Supp. 817 (1902);
Cf. Smith v. Cushatt, 199 Iowa 690, 202 N. W. 548 (1925) (Where subsequent
lease was to expire prior to expiration of period of redemption, a tenant
who in good faith paid rent to the mortgagor before the mortgagee had
any rights to the rent, could not be dispossessed or compelled to account
for the rental value of the land.); Offman v. Cheney, 204 Wis. 56, 234 N. W.
325 (1931); Grether v. Nick, 193 Wis. 503, 213 N. W. 304 (1927). There
would have been no eviction of the lessee until the expiration of the
period of redemption regardless of prepayment of rent.
"Ganz v. Clark, 252 N. Y. 92, 169 N. E. 100 (1929); 2 UNDERHILL, LAND-
LORD AND TENANT (1909) § 427; 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1912) § 79
(a): "A lease ordinarily contains an express covenant of quiet enjoyment
by the lessee, but even though such a covenant is not expressed it will
be implied." Duncklee v. Webber, 151 Mass. 408, 24 N. E. 1082 (1890)
(Foreclosure sale under a mortgage prior to lease is breach of covenant,
express or implied.).
"Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. 21st & 5th Ave. Corp., 110 Misc. 126,
180 N. Y. Supp. 358 (1920).
6""If there is an express covenant against disturbance by the lessor or
those claiming under him, this limits the effect of the implied covenant
so that there is in such case no covenant against disturbance by one
having paramount title, and yet such disturbance, if it amounts to an
eviction will suspend the right to rent." 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT
(1912) § 79 (a).
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